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RON COFFEY: THE THINKER'S 
THINKER 
Peter M Gerhartt 
Good thought does not come in predetenn1ned categories; there is 
no necessary division between legal thought, economic thought, and 
philosophical thought, or between contract and torts. Good thought 
avoids the superficial and general, focusirig instead on the particular 
and the precise. Good thought works out the models that allow us to 
organize our beliefs about cause and effect and values and behavior 
and to compare models across subject matter. Good thought avoids 
using words that are ambiguous or vacuous, except when we 
acknowledge their use as placeholders until our analysis permits 
greater specificity. Good thought seeks to analyze, which means to 
tear things apart into constituent parts and then reconstruct a way df 
thinking about the problem we are working on in a way that reveals 
the normative justification for one course of action over another. 
Ronald J. Coffey was among the first on our faculty, and (I 
daresay) in the country, to recognize these attributes of good thought 
and to bring them to bear on the study oflaw. He has been passionate 
about methodology-that is, about the_ modes of thought that are the 
hallmark of good analysis. He understands legal analysis not as the 
application of rules, doctrine or abstract principles, but the other way 
around-as the construction of the outcome (and therefore of rules, 
dq~tlliJ.~,_and prin~ipl.eJ>) tl:I~! .QQ1l1P...QTI~_wjfu_~_jl.!~ti_flc:l!ti.Q!l JQQ1e.4 !II _ 
an understanding of the kind of problem the law faces, the kinds of 
values that ought to be considered in addressing the problem, and the 
behavioral traits of people that allow us to predict how people will act 
in light of social and socially constructed (i.e.~ legal) incentives. We 
came to call this justificational analysis. It is what good legal scholars 
do. 
t Professor, Case Western Reserve School of Law and former Dean (1986-1996). 
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Ron's methodology is interdisciplinary, drawing on the best and 
newest insights from virtually every field of study. Although his own 
thought bas been most closely identified with what came to be called 
economic analysis, his attraction to economics was methodological, 
not substantive. The economists had seemed to discover, before other 
behavioral sciences, the value of models and systematic thought. This 
allowed economists to break matters down to their core causal 
elements, to identify underlying assumptions, and to use modeis of 
behavioral response to identify what would happen if the underlying 
assumptions were changed. It was this systemic thinking about human 
behavior in the light of incentives that allowed economists to study 
human behavior with specificity and that therefore aligned the 
behavioral science of economics with the behavioral science oflaw. It 
was this syst~matic thinking that attracted Ron to economic analysis. 
But Ron was never wedded to a single or nfu-row view of 
economics. He is neither Posnerian nor libertarian; neither Baumolian 
nor interventionist. He understands and respects both markets and 
market failure, both efficiency and equity. Although skeptical of the 
value of legal intervention, he starts his analysis without lmowing 
where the analysis will take him. His mind does not try to prove that 
markets (or the law) generally tend toward efficient results (the 
efficiency hypothesis), for he lmows this about the efficiency 
hypothesis: it is tautological unless the analyst specifies the nature of 
the efficiency that is sought and it is unnecessary once the analyst 
specifies the nature of efficiency that is sought. 
Then, as the analytical rigor of economic analysis began to 
infiltrate t..lJ.e other behavioral sciences, Ron rejoiced in seeing how 
learning from various behavioral sciences could be interwoven to 
create a more complete view of various influences on human 
behavior. 
Moreover, Ron's reliance on learning from other disciplines is 
never an interest in abstract thought or theory for theory's sake. What 
matters to him is the application of learning from other disciplines to 
the issues the law faces, and the law requires that intervention choices 
be made. Therefore, to Ron, interdisciplinary learning must "mesh" 
with the law by being ,-integrated into legal analysis, by paying 
attention to the institutional setting in which legal decisions are made, 
and by appreciating the institutional constraints of a rule-based 
system. Ron's intellectual firepower is directed at intensely practical 
results: how to understand and advocate within a system that believes 
the law to be based on rules, doctrine, and principles. He taught us 
that doctrine does not matter until we understand the range of thought 
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that allows us to apply doctrine in concrete cases to achieve a justified 
result, and that once we understand the appropriate analytical factors 
the doctrine comes alive in a way that allows it to be applied in other 
situations. 
Few, if any, on the faculty have read as widely as Ron. His daily 
consumption encompasses not only the major currents in legal 
thought but all of the major economic journals, in all phases of 
economics. He is consistently ahead of the curve. Amartya Sen was 
appreciated in economics, but not in law, before he won the Nobel 
Prize, but Ron brought him to our attention long before he was 
understood to. be ·a Nobel candidate. And 'long before behavioral 
economics became a buzzword in law, Ron had understood 
economics. as a behavioral science and therefore understood the 
import~ce ' of interpreting the . rational person in light of 
psychological realities. Freak:onomics was never freaky to Ron 
because he never defmed economics by the narrow view of the 
rational person. Altruism was not a mystery to Ron because he 
understood that. economics does not assume the maximization of any 
particular valu~it only assumes that people (and communities) will 
want to maximization some value. 
Few, if any, on the faculty have integrated their reading into a 
comprehensive view of the foundational theories that are used in 
understanding intervention choice. Perhaps Ron's greatest intellectual 
gift is his ability to understand the relationship between seeming 
disparate phenomena by understanding them as offshoots of common 
models of behavior. Consumer decision in the face of uncertainty is 
like voter decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like 
interpersonal decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like 
producer decision in the face of uncertainty, which is like· social 
decision in the face of uncertainty. Whatever the decision, people or 
groups protect themselves against uncertainty in ways that can be 
modeled-and-understood comparatively. And comparing reactions to 
uncertainty across contexts allows us to develop· a more complete 
theory ofbehavior in the light of uncertainty. 
And Ron's thought is not limited to concepts of efficiency. 
Although Ron despairs of fmding any way of modeling the 
efficiency/equity trade-off in a way that would allow us to tractably 
compare the apples of equity with the oranges of efficiency, he 
marvels at various theories of fairness and is eager to pursue them in 
justificational analysis. His only requirement is methodological: is 
systematic and analytical thought being applied to theories of fairness 
in the same way th~t we apply it to theories of efficiency? 
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Few on the faculty have written as much as Ron, although many 
have published much more than Ron. Our students were the 
beneficiaries of his writing, for it often came in the form of material 
for class. Binders of material that he has prepared stand in his office 
as a testament to his comprehensive and diligent pursuit of 
justificational analysis in the fields in which he taught. He used his 
own material in most of his courses and it was never stale. Sarbanes-
Oxley was not an appendix to Ron's material; it was a part of the 
material from the time there was a glimmer of the fraud that it 
addressed. Not enough of this writing has gotten out of the binders 
and into print, but it is not too late. Ron is retiring from teaching but 
not from thinking and (it is to be hoped) from publishing. But the 
target of his materials is a moving one and in the author's view the 
material has never been quite good enough. 
Perfectionism, rigor, and integration have their costs, and one of 
those costs is that in order to get access to Ron's thought you have to 
get access to either his binders or to his conversation about ideas. His 
students were lucky, for their access to both the binders and the 
conversation was immediate and plentiful. For those colleagues who 
took the time to access his ideas, the rewards were many. The 
University of Chicago had Aaron Director, a teacher of teachers 
whose influence came not from publishing but from thinking broadly 
and teaching deeply1; we have had Ron Coffey. For those who took 
the effort to access his mind, the force of his thought will be carried 
forward in countless ofunprogrammed and productive ways. 
I See Aaron Director Founded Field of Law and Economics, UNIVERSITY OF CIDCAGO 
CHRONICLE, September 24, 2004, available at http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/040923/obit-
director.shtml. 
